CRAIG MATTHEW PRINCIPE
the Fourth Circuit became the first to adopt a subjective construction of Section 871(a), creating its infamous "present intent" requirement.
4 All other circuits presented with the task of interpreting Section 871(a), have adopted an objective construction of the statute, which translates into a negligence standard for a criminal statute-something criminal law typically disapproves of. 5 The result is a heavily imbalanced "circuit split" with only the Fourth Circuit taking an independent stand on the issue of criminal culpability for threats made under Section 871(a).
6
Although this division has persisted for over thirty-five years without resolution, 7 recent events force us to reexamine the issue of the proper culpability standard for the threats against the president statute. On January 8, 2011, a gunman attempted to shoot and kill Arizona Representative Gabrielle Giffords at a public event.
8 Investigators identified Representative Giffords as the target of the attack and noted that the congresswoman had received numerous threats.
9 While Representative Giffords was very fortunate to survive the shooting despite serious injuries, several other bystanders were injured and tragically killed, including Chief Judge John M. Roll of the District Court for Arizona, and nine-year old Christina Taylor Green.
10 It remains unclear whether the gunman, twenty-two-year-old Jared Lee Loughner, was motivated by politics 11 or a personal nihilistic desire to create chaos.
12 Pima County Sheriff Clarence W. Dupnik caused controversy by blaming the shooting on "vitriolic rhetoric" and a toxic political environment in Arizona.
13 Regardless of Loughner's motivation, this tragic event in Arizona has prompted Congress to amend the "Threats against the President" statute to encompass members of Congress or members-of-Congress-elect.
14 If this amendment passes, the scope of this statute would expand, from two to four persons at any given time to well over five hundred.
15 Thus, the debate over whether the "willfully" element of Section 871(a) requires a subjective or objective construction has taken on a new significance and needs to be addressed in light of these developments.
This Article examines the holding of United States v. Patillo and argues that if Congress amends Section 871(a), it should also clarify the culpability standard for the statute. Specifically, Congress must address what is meant by "willfully" and should adopt the original holding of Patillo as the proper standard for threats against the President. This analysis will reveal that the Fourth Circuit's holding in Patillo, like many other holdings in threats cases, has been largely misinterpreted. A crucial misunderstanding is that the present intent requirement applies to all Section 871(a) cases. 16 A primary objective here is to parse out the core holding of Patillo to delineate how the Fourth Circuit identified a factual dichotomy of Section 871(a) cases where the present intent standard applies to just one of the two parts.
17 This Article also includes an empirical study of outcomes in Section 871(a) threats cases, in order to assess whether having two different mens rea standards is problematic and if so, which construction of Section 871(a)-subjective or objective-is preferable.
The study compares outcomes under the Fourth Circuit's subjective standard with outcomes under the other circuits' objective standard by using data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics Database.
18 Theoretically, a subjective standard essentially mandates that prosecutors prove an additional specific intent requirement. Regardless of how the requirement is defined, 19 that additional element would make it harder for prosecutors to prove their case. This in turn would affect defendants' decisions with respect to plea bargains. Thus, this study looks at three measures that could indicate whether the difference between a subjective regime and an objective or knowing, or voluntary, as distinguished from accidental. But when used in a criminal statute it generally means an act done with a bad purpose," which correlates to criminal blameworthiness.
26

B. CONTEXT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 18 U.S.C. SECTION 871
The Threats against the President statute was passed on February 14, 1917 . 27 The law has been on the books for almost one hundred years, yet the original language is essentially the same as it was then.
28 Most significantly, Congress used the same "knowingly and willfully" language that appears in the statute today.
29 At that time, three United States Presidents had been assassinated in office: Abraham Lincoln in 1865, James Garfield in 1881, and William McKinley in 1901.
30 Theodore Roosevelt, who became President upon the assassination of McKinley, was also the target of a failed assassination attempt while running for a third term in 1912 on the Progressive ticket.
31 Such events undoubtedly influenced the House Judiciary Committee members that sponsored the law. In fact, the committee report stated that the bill, H.R. 15314, was "designed to restrain and punish those who would threaten to take the life of, or inflict bodily harm upon, the President of this Republic."
32 The report also stated, "It is the first and highest duty of a Government to protect its governmental agencies, in the performance of their public services, from threats of violence which would tend to coerce them or restrain them in the performance of their duties."
33
During debates in the House of Representatives, the chief sponsor of the bill, Representative Edwin Yates Webb, 34 was forced to defend the "willfully" phraseology. 35 As Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, he was intimately familiar with the bill. 36 After the bill was read by the Clerk, Representative Raker asked Webb whether, "in line 3 the words 'and willfully' and the same words in lines 8 and 9 ought to be stricken from the bill, for the reason that if a man knowing [sic] does an act, that ought to be sufficient to punish him." 37 Webb responded:
I do not think so . . . I think he ought to be shown to have done it willfully. I think it must be a willful intent to do serious injury to the President. If you make it a mere technical offense, you do not give him much of a chance when he comes to answer before a court and jury. I do not think we ought to be too anxious to convict a man who does a thing thoughtlessly. I think it ought to be a willful expression of an intent to carry out a threat against the Executive, and I hope that the gentleman will not offer his amendment.
38
Webb expressed his belief that the crime to be punished by this language was meant to require more than knowingly making a threat; it also required some form of regime is a meaningful one: (1) the number of investigations or arrests and bookings compared to the number of indictments filed; (2) the number of cases filed compared with the number of cases that either go to trial or result in pleas; and, (3) the results at trial comparing rates of acquittal with guilty verdicts. In light of the purposes of this statute and the empirical data comparing the subjective and objective approaches to culpability under Section 871(a), this Article concludes that the Patillo approach best serves the state's interests in protecting the President and his movements, balancing those priorities with the greatest amount of protection for individuals subject to the criminal sanction of Section 871(a). 
II. THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT
21
This section prohibits two forms of threats against the President-by mailing "any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document containing any threat" or "otherwise mak[ing] any such threat. . . "
22 Regardless of the method used to convey the threat, both require that it be made "knowingly and willfully."
23
Both the Supreme Court in Watts v. United States (1969) and the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Patillo (1971) emphasize that within this "knowingly and willfully" requirement, "willfully" is the decisive source of the mens rea of the statute. 24 The Supreme Court in United States v. Murdock 25 explains that willfully "often denotes an act which is intentional, criminal culpability, which according to Webb should have been the "intent to carry out a threat against the Executive." 39 He emphasized, " [t] his is the language used in nearly all the statutes where the intent constitutes the crime. You find it in the statutes against murder and embezzlement, and I had rather keep the word 'willfully' in."
40
Representative Volstead, also responding to Raker's suggestion of eliminating willfully, stated that "[t]he word 'willful' conveys, as ordinarily used, the idea of wrongful as well as intentional."
41 He also illustrated the harm that might befall someone if the word willfully were taken out of the bill.
42
He said:
This statute does not require that the instrument shall be sent to the President. It might be sent to some other person. If, as the gentleman suggests, you strike out the word 'willfully,' a person who simply sends an instrument, say, a newspaper that contains such a threat, to some friend to call his attention to the matter, would do so knowingly, and would come within the language of this bill.
43
In articulating this concern, Volstead raised a factual matter which influenced the Patillo court's holding decades later-"a true threat against the person of the President . .
. uttered without communication to the President intended."
44 In other words, the factual situation common in Section 871(a) cases, where the threat was not mailed to or spoken to the President or the Secret Service, but rather was mailed or spoken to some other person such as a friend, stranger, or coworker. The significance of this factual distinction and the relevance of willfulness in punishing such threats will be discussed in the section on Patillo below.
Interestingly, the significance of this debate and the early cases construing the statute figured prominently in D.C. Circuit Judge J. Skelly Wright's dissent in Watts v. United States. 45 This dissent was referenced later by the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion when it reversed the D.C. Circuit and disposed of the case based upon the true threats analysis established by that landmark First Amendment decision, but not before the Court expressed its "grave doubts" about an objective standard for willfulness. 46 In his dissent, Wright argues that courts should look to the legislative history for Section 871(a), particularly Webb's statements, when performing statutory construction of Section 871(a).
47
In a footnote, Wright stated, "[a] statute punishing a 'threat' made 'knowingly and willfully' is hardly so unambiguous as to preclude looking to the legislative history for clarification of the mental element required. 53 His alleged threats were made orally in the presence of third-parties. 54 The first count of the indictment alleged that Ragansky said, "I can make bombs and I will make bombs and blow up the President."
55 The second count stated that he said, "We ought to make the biggest bomb in the world and take it down to the White House and put it on the dome and blow up President Wilson and all the rest of the crooks, and get President Wilson and all of the rest of the crooks and blow it up."
56 The third count alleged that Ragansky said, "I would like to make a bomb big enough to blow up the Capitol and President and all the Senators and everybody in it."
57
Virtually every case and article citing Ragansky, mentions the statement made in the first count of the indictment, 58 despite the fact that the other two statements contain language of hyperbole. This is curious because Ragansky's defense was that his statements were actually made in jest and that the jury charge ignored the word willfully in the statute. 59 As the court noted, Ragansky's claim "appear[ed] to have been that [he] had no intention to carry out his threat, and that, therefore, it was a joke."
60 Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit upheld the conviction based upon the jury instruction that had been given.
61
Furthermore, the court elaborated on the meaning of the phrase "knowingly and willfully," 62 and its brief statement of those terms has since formed the basis of the Ragansky Test.
The Seventh Circuit first stated that "[a] threat is knowingly made, if the maker of it comprehends the meaning of the words uttered by him; a foreigner, ignorant of the English language, repeating these same words without knowledge of their meaning, may not knowingly have made a threat."
63 Next, the court stated that, " [a] threat is willfully made, if in addition to comprehending the meaning of his words [(i.e., knowingly)], the maker voluntarily and intentionally utters them as the declaration of an apparent determination to carry them into execution."
64 An "apparent determination" is an objective standard by which the fact finder must look at the words stated and then consider what a reasonable person would believe the speaker meant by those words.
65 If the reasonable person believes the speaker was making a serious threat, then that is proof that the threat was made willfully. The test also incorporates a negligence standard, according to the Seventh Circuit, which rejected the notion that a prosecutor must prove the defendant "used [such language] with an evil or malicious intent to express a sentiment to be impressed upon the minds of persons through which it might create a sentiment of hostility to the security of the President, 'that willfully implies an evil purpose-legal malice. This passage is so crucial to properly understanding the holding of Patillo that it must be analyzed one sentence at a time. First, the court identifies two categories of Section 871 cases based upon the facts of such cases: those where the defendant communicates his threat directly "to the President intended" (e.g., by speaking or mailing a threat directly to the President or the Secret Service) and those where the defendant does not communicate his threat directly to the President intended (e.g., by mailing a letter or saying something to a friend, stranger, or other third-party).
77 The court identifies Patillo's case as falling into the second category.
78 Next, the court says that because the Patillo case does not involve the communication of a threat directly to the President intended, the court "do[es] not here consider what intent requirement may be effective to accomplish an insulation of the President from threats of violence to his person" under those conditions.
79 This statement strongly indicates that the Fourth Circuit's holding in Patillo was only meant to apply to the second category of cases: threats not directed to the President intended.
The Fourth Circuit's own statement of the holding supports this interpretation. The court states, " [w] e hold that where, as in Patillo's case, a true threat against the person of the President is uttered without communication to the President intended," (i.e., category two only), "the threat can form a basis for conviction under the terms of Section 871(a) only if made with a present intent to do injury to the President."
80 Thus, a careful reading of the holding in Patillo suggests that it should be narrowly applied to only one of two categories of Section 871(a) cases, not to all Section 871(a) cases generally.
This view that the Patillo holding created a factual dichotomy approach to analysis of Section 871(a) cases is acknowledged by the Fourth Circuit's opinion thirty years later in United States v. Spring. 81 In Spring, the court used Patillo as a basis of comparison, citing, "Cf. Patillo, 431 F.2d at 297-98 (distinguishing among threats against the President based on whether they were transmitted (or were intended to be transmitted) to the President or to a third party)."
82 Although this statement validates the approach described above, it is a mere indirect reference to the dichotomy created by the holding. No reported case in the Fourth Circuit or elsewhere has expressly acknowledged the true holding of Patillo.
The significance of this dichotomy and the Fourth Circuit's holding, requires further explanation. After stating its holding, the Patillo court discussed the purpose of the statute and the three ways of proving the present intent requirement in category two cases.
83 The court wrote:
We agree with [the Second and Ninth Circuits] that the statute was designed to prevent a secondary evil other than actual assaults upon the President or incitement to assault the President, and that it is a legitimate area of congressional concern to prevent and make criminal disruption of presidential activity and movement that may result simply from publication of an apparent threat upon the President's life. When a threat is published with an intent to disrupt presidential activity, we think there is sufficient mens rea under the secondary sanction of the statute.
84
In this passage, the Fourth Circuit acknowledges that there is a secondary sanction of the statute-the disruption of presidential activity.
85 Furthermore, the court rejects the Ragansky Test of intention-although properly understood, this rejection only applies to category two cases.
86
For category two cases, the court describes three theories of a Section 871 offense:
We think that an essential element of guilt is a present intention either to injure the President, or incite others to injure him, or to restrict his movements, and that the trier of fact may find the latter intention from the nature of the publication of the threat, i.e., whether the person making the threat might reasonably anticipate that it would be transmitted to law enforcement officers and others charged with the security of the President.
87
The phrase "the latter intention" refers to the third theory of the offense for category two cases: restricting the movements of the President.
88 The court notes, "Much of what we say here is dicta justified, we think, by apparent misunderstanding of our prior panel decision. For Patillo was not prosecuted on a theory of intention to disrupt presidential activity and the nature of publication of his threat would scarcely support it."
89
The use of the term "publication" is somewhat confusing since Patillo did not mail or publish a threat, but was indicted for allegedly making verbal statements to a coworker on two separate occasions while the two security guards were on night patrol at a Norfolk based Naval Shipyard.
90 Nevertheless, the court's distinction of Patillo's case, which was prosecuted under a theory of "present intention to injure the President," as compared to the Ninth and Second Circuit decisions referred to in the opinion, which were prosecuted under a theory of "present intention to disrupt presidential activity," is a very important one.
91 It is a distinction which acknowledges the nuances of both the factual dichotomy of Section 871(a) cases noted above and the three different theories of prosecution under Section 871(a). It also helps inform the Patillo court's demarcation of category one and category two cases.
The framework of Section 871(a) offenses post-Patillo can be viewed as follows: Patillo's case falls under category two and was prosecuted under theory one (see table above). Therefore, the court's specific concern in Patillo was what intent requirement best suits a defendant who makes a verbal statement to a coworker, not directly to the President intended or to persons in authority positions likely to convey such information to the Secret Service or Office of the President. The court writes:
As to Patillo's case which is quite different from Roy's and Compton's, we adhere to the panel decision . . . adding to it only that the trier of fact may, of course, consider all relevant facts concerning the background of the defendant, his motives, the manner in which the threat was made, and the reaction of those who heard the threat and thus have an opportunity to form an opinion about the speaker's present intention to injure the President of the United States.
93
Because of the significant effort the court makes to clearly distinguish between category one and two, and between theories of the offense for category two, these factors must apply only to cases prosecuted under category two.
These distinctions are sensible because Section 871(a) has the potential to criminalize a wide variety of writings or verbal statements made in vastly different contexts and directed to many different types of people. The Fourth Circuit in Patillo was most concerned with establishing a proper standard for individuals making statements that could be perceived as true threats, in casual conversation with individuals not in a position of authority, or likely to transmit such statements to the Secret Service or the Office of the President. 94 In such factual scenarios, the Fourth Circuit deemed it necessary that the individual uttering a true threat must have the present intent at the time the statement was made, to injure the President at some point in the future, including injuring the President by disrupting his future movements.
95
This present intent requirement would effectively sort out those for punishment who were truly culpable under category two cases (those not made directly to the President intended), by dividing persons making true threats into two groups: first, those who are culpable, because they wrote or uttered true threats and meant to injure the President or carry out those threats at a future point in time, and second, those who are not culpable, because even though they wrote or uttered true threats, they had no present intention to actually injure the President or carry out those threats. A careful and scrutinizing reading of the Patillo opinion, however, indicates that such factors have limited application to category two cases and do not apply to category one cases. Thus, category one cases might still be subject to an objective intent standard or a more relaxed subjective intent standard (intent to make a true threat, though not necessarily with the intent to injure the President or to carry out the threat) even under Patillo. 99 Section 879 extends the protections of Section 871 from just the President and successor to the Presidency to include former Presidents and the immediate family of a former President, the immediate family of the President, the President-elect, the Vice President, or the Vice President-elect, a major candidate for the office of President or Vice President, or a member of the immediate family of such a candidate, or any person protected by the Secret Service under Section 3056(a)(6).
IV. 18 U.S.C. § 879 AND CONGRESS'S INITIAL RESPONSE TO THE CULPABILITY CONTROVERSY IN § 871(A) CASE LAW
100 Section 879 also uses the same exact phraseology "knowingly and willfully." 101 
Interestingly, Section 879 was passed in 1982,
102 whereas § 871 was passed more than a half-century earlier.
103 Thus Congress was well aware of the controversy that had arisen in the aftermath of Watts regarding the proper culpability standard. This is evident from the House of Representatives Report 97-725 in which the Judiciary Committee stated that:
The committee is aware that the term 'knowingly and willfully' as used in Section 871 has not been uniformly construed by the courts. Some courts have broadly construed the term, in accord with the explicit purpose of the legislation to prevent interference with the conduct of presidential duties, and have not required evidence of intent to carry out the threatened act. . . . One court has required evidence of an individual's intent to carry out the threat [(referring to Patillo in a footnote)].
104
Although Congress acknowledged the circuit split on this issue, their one line reference to the holding of Patillo is an oversimplification of the standard set by the Patillo court, as this analysis has shown. Furthermore, Congress did nothing to address Section 871(a), only to put a different standard for "willfully" in Section 879. 105 Indeed, the committee went on to say, "With regard to Section 879 . . . the committee construes a threat that is 'knowingly and willfully' made as one which the maker intends to be perceived as a threat regardless of whether he or she intends to carry it out."
106 As expressed through a footnote, the committee essentially adopted Justice Marshall's subjective construction-requiring proof of subjective intent to make a true threat, but not necessarily to carry out that threat.
107 The committee justified its implementation of Section 879 because of the fact that "[t]he investigation and prosecution of such threats has been hampered because of a lack of an applicable federal statute similar to the presidential threat statute."
108
When comparing different threats statutes, confusion often arises. One source of confusion is caused by a blending of the true threats analysis with the mens rea requirements of a given threats statute. Each specific statement of law in a given case may not be an error in and of itself. Yet, the blending together of such tests for the purposes of one case, often leads to confusion when the language of those opinions or jury instructions laying out the blended test are then relied upon in other cases or jurisdictions dealing with the same or a different threats statute. This problem has been recognized in some secondary sources.
109
True threats tests ensure compliance with First Amendment protections while mens rea culpability requirements set the bar for what non-constitutionally-protected verbal or non-verbal utterances are blameworthy under the purposes of the statute involved. As a matter of legal analysis, it makes sense to draw a line in the sand on this issue and to consider each test independently, rather than blend the inquiries together.
110 Such clarity could assist judges and lawmakers in developing the law of threats in a manner that minimizes confusion and maximizes just and constitutional principles. This Court therefore construes the willfulness requirement of [18 U.S.C. § 871(a)] to require only that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President, and that the statement not be the result of mistake, duress, or coercion. The statute does not require that the defendant actually intend to carry out the threat.
V. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT - § 871(A) ACROSS THE CIRCUITS TODAY
are three operating standards for the willfulness element of Section 871(a). The first and largest category is the Roy/Ragansky standard to which nine circuits clearly adhere.
115
Circuits adopting the Roy/Ragansky standard sometimes use language more akin to that used in Ragansky, 116 although regardless of the language, the test objectively views the words written or spoken from the perspective of a reasonable person. For example, in United States v. Compton, the Second Circuit expressly approved 117 of the lower courts jury instruction which read:
[I]f it found that a true threat was made, it must further find that the threat was made 'knowingly and willfully,' and that 'the government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant comprehended the words he uttered, that he voluntarily and intentionally uttered them with the apparent determination to carry them into execution.' . . . 'Although for a find- Thus, for the purposes of this case, to obtain a conviction under section 871 the Government was required to establish 'that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious one.'
134
The Eighth Circuit was apparently trying only to resolve the case before it and seemed to be going out of its way to emphasize that the Marshall Test from Rogers was not the newly adopted standard of the Eighth Circuit.
135 Nevertheless, this exemplifies how a limited holding has been given a life beyond its original holding.
In United States v. Cvijanovich, decided in 2009, the Eighth Circuit stated that under Section 871(a), "[t]he government must establish 'that the defendant appreciated the threatening nature of his statement and intended at least to convey the impression that the threat was a serious one.'" 136 The court cites its Frederickson opinion for support and quotes from the language of Justice Marshall's concurring opinion in Rogers. 137 Thus, the Marshall Test appears to be Eighth Circuit law, despite the limitations originally placed on the holding in Frederickson. While this standard is a subjective standard, it is not quite the same as the Patillo test, which requires not simply a subjective intent to make a true threat, but a subjective present intent to carry out the threat or injure the President.
138 Therefore, while both the Patillo (as applied to category two cases) and the Marshall tests are subjective, the quantum of proof required to establish the subjective intent element of the Patillo test is a much higher burden-or at least is presumed to be theoretically.
The Patillo holding and the present intent standard has been laid out in detail above and need not be repeated; however, it is worth noting at this point that the court in Patillo, when comparing its standard to that in Roy, stated, "[i]t was in [the same] context that the Ninth Circuit opinion contained the statement: 'The statute does not require that the defendant actually intend to carry out the threat.' . . . Our panel decision in this case is not to the contrary."
139 How can one reconcile the statement that their Patillo decision was not contrary to the Ninth Circuit's Roy standard? Presumably, the Patillo court was creating (or thought it was creating) a limited holding that distinguished Roy from Patillo, and was not establishing a different standard for category one cases like Roy. Since other circuits, secondary sources, and even the Fourth Circuit's subsequent cases have not clearly and explicitly acknowledged this dichotomy, for the purposes of the following empirical analysis, it will be presumed that the present intent standard has been applied uniformly to all Fourth Circuit cases, regardless of the factual circumstances of each case. This may prove to be a faulty assumption, but it is necessary to attempt a cross-circuit comparison of Section 871(a) standards using the data which is available.
VI. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF A PRESENT INTENT STANDARD ON INVESTIGATIONS, PROSECUTIONS, AND VERDICTS IN § 871 CASES
Theoretically, anything that adds to the burden of proof for a given offense should affect the decisions investigators, prosecutors, defendants, and defense attorneys make. As additional elements are added-such as a specific intent elementor as the mens rea requirement becomes difficult or complex to prove, one would expect that investigators would convert fewer investigations to arrests, prosecutors would file charges in a smaller percentage of investigations, that defendants would take their chances going to trial more often, and that sentences would be proportionate to the degree of culpability or criminal blameworthiness. This is the framework from which this empirical study was developed.
These assumptions, on their face, are reasonable. For example, the Third Circuit noted in United States v. Kosma that "[a] subjective test makes it considerably more difficult for the government to prosecute threats against the President. While this might be tolerable in other contexts, the compelling, and indeed paramount, interest in safeguarding the President dictates otherwise," thus justifying the adoption of an objective standard.
140 It is also important to note that much of the scholarly discussion of the law of threats is based upon assumptions that the standards we choose will actually have an impact in the application of the law. This makes such an empirical study important, because it affords an opportunity to examine what is actually happening in practice, and to determine whether theory aligns with reality. This empirical study is based upon the analysis of data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics' Federal Criminal Case Processing Statistics database.
141 Three measures were used to test whether the Fourth Circuit's present intent standard, as compared with all other circuits, has resulted in differences in: (1) the number of investigations or arrests and bookings compared to the number of indictments filed; (2) the number of cases filed compared with the number of cases that either go to trial or result in pleas; and, (3) the results at trial comparing rates of acquittal with guilty verdicts.
A. MEASURE ONE: FROM INVESTIGATION OR ARREST TO INDICTMENT
During the twelve-year period of 1998 to 2009, there were 2,224 investigations concluded for threats made against the President.
142 Of those investigations, prosecutors declined prosecutions seventy-eight percent of the time and cases were filed eighteen percent of the time.
143 Unfortunately, due to the nature in which investigations data is tracked, the data cannot be categorized by circuit. The only way to make circuit-to-circuit comparisons of defendants moving from the investigatory stage to the prosecutorial stage is by comparing, by circuit, arrests to indictments and felony information proceedings. The arrests data did not include the variable specifically for threats against the President, but only for threatening communications; therefore, to best approximate the number of arrests for threats against the President by circuit, a special formula was used; 144 there is likely some error, leaning towards an underestimation of the total number of arrests.
The analysis of the conversion rate from arrests to indictments produced the following results: of 390 total arrests across all circuits, there were 337 indictments filed, which is an 86.41 percent conversion rate; of forty arrests in the Fourth Circuit, forty indictments were filed, which is a one hundred percent conversion rate; of the 350 arrests across all other circuits, there were 329 indictments filed, which is an 84.86 percent conversion rate.
145 These results do not correspond with the theoretical expectation that the more elements one must prove, or the more difficult the mens rea is to prove, the less likely prosecutors will be to accept cases. While the percentage breakdown may suffer from some degree of error, it is clear that the Fourth Circuit conversion rate is above the average and the all other circuit conversion rate is just below the average. Regardless of degree, the opposite arrangement was expected. There are two alternative explanations for these results. First, it is possible that due to the higher burden of proof, agents have grown accustomed to the heightened requirements of the Fourth Circuit's standard, and thus only arrest suspects when it is believed that a solid case has been built. A second possibility is that the distinction between an objective and a subjective mens rea standard does not actually translate into a perceptible difference in practice.
B. MEASURE TWO: FROM INDICTMENT TO TRIAL
The second potential measure of a difference between the Fourth Circuit standard and that of other circuits is the rate at which defendants pursue trial versus making a plea. 147 This, combined with the Fourth Circuit's present intent requirement for Section 871(a), would suggest that more defendants and defense attorneys would pursue going to trial over taking a plea and would likely prefer a jury trial over a bench trial. This second assumption, however, is based on the presumption that it would be harder to convince a jury of twelve lay persons to convict rather than one judge.
The data, however, does not reflect this assumption. In the Fourth Circuit, only 8.11 percent of cases proceed to trial, compared with 12.16 percent in all other circuits from 1998 to 2009.
148 More surprisingly, only three cases went to trial in the Fourth Circuit in that same twelve-year period.
149 Of those three cases, two were tried before a judge, and only one was tried before a jury.
150 The jury trial resulted in an acquittal and the two bench trials resulted in guilty convictions.
151 Due to the small number of Section 871(a) cases which go to trial overall, especially in the Fourth Circuit, it is difficult to tell whether these conversion rates are significant in testing the hypothesis that the Fourth Circuit's present intent requirement would result in more cases going to trial and more acquittals. There are also other alternatives to consider, such as the possibility that the difference between an objective mens rea standard and a subjective mens rea standard is not all that different in practice.
Another possibility is that federal prosecutors are very adept in selecting cases with sufficient evidence to prosecute; thus, regardless of the standard employed by the circuit, the results turn out similarly.
C. MEASURE THREE: RESULTS AT TRIAL
As indicated in the section above, defendants in the Fourth Circuit have not fared well at trial, with two out of three defendants being convicted in the last twelve years and only one acquitted.
152 In the Fourth Circuit, sixty-seven percent of defendants at trial were convicted and thirty-three percent acquitted compared with forty-five percent of defendants in all other circuits convicted and fifty-five percent acquitted.
153 The fact that more than half of all defendants in other circuits who went to trial were acquitted is astonishing. It reveals the inherent difficulty of prosecuting Threats against the President cases in general. It also questions the assumption that proving an objective standard will be easy. This data indicates that in practice there is far less of a distinction between subjective and objective willfulness standards in Section 871(a) cases than commentators and judges previously thought.
In order to test whether the data is just too small to properly measure the distinction between the Patillo standard and the other standards, which do not require a showing of intent to injure the President or carry out the threat, an additional comparison was made. Fourth Circuit and Eighth Circuit (soft subjective standard) data were combined and compared against all other circuits (limited to the Roy/Ragansky standard). This analysis shows a slightly different outcome, but not dramatically so. When combining Fourth and Eighth Circuit data, defendants who went to trial on a subjective standard were acquitted fifty-seven percent (four of seven) of the time and convicted forty-three percent (three of seven).
154 This compares with fiftytwo percent of defendants (fourteen of twenty-seven) acquitted under the Roy/Ragansky Test and forty-eight percent convicted (thirteen of twenty-seven).
155 While isolating the strong and weak subjective intent standards into one category did cause the acquittal rate to exceed that of the objective standard, it was only by a few percentage points and just one different outcome in a single case would shift those numbers. Perhaps more importantly, once the acquittal and conviction rates are isolated, they became more equalized, rather than polarized. This further adds to the evidence that the subjective and objective distinction is not a meaningful one in application.
VII. THE PATILLO STANDARD, PROPERLY UNDERSTOOD, DESERVES RECOGNITION AS THE BEST STANDARD FOR THE UNITED STATES GOING FORWARD
As the empirical assessment above reveals, the objective mens rea standard of the Roy/Ragansky Test may not be the boogeyman that some, including the Watts Court, feared it to be.
156 Although the available data is probably insufficient to draw ironclad conclusions, it seems safe to conclude that there is parity between the subjective present intent standard and the objective standard in terms of influencing conversion rates for arrests, indictments, trials, and acquittals in Section 871(a) cases. Does this necessarily support the assertion of those champions of the status quo-that there is no true "conflict" between the circuits to be resolved? No. Congress is considering amending Section 871(a) to apply to all congressmen and congressmen-elect. 157 If they proceed on that path, it seems necessary, for the sake of consistency, that they choose one standard over the other and include in the statute the definition of the term "willfully."
The issue remains whether a free nation like the United States should be willing to have a Presidential threat statute that criminally punishes offenders with a maximum of five years in prison, without showing some subjective criminal culpability to either injure the President or carry out the threat (hard subjective standard) or at least that the speaker had the intent for his words to be considered a serious threat to the President (soft subjective standard). In short, the idea that we would punish persons using a negligence standard for statements that could be construed as true threats, but not intended as threats, is problematic and runs contrary to the tradition of criminal law in the United States.
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Even if adopting a subjective intent standard will not dramatically change the outcomes of investigations and prosecutions, as the data suggests, it is probably worth taking this stand on
The fact that more than half of all defendants in other circuits who went to trial were acquitted is astonishing. It reveals the inherent difficulty of prosecuting Threats against the President cases in general. It also questions the assumption that proving an objective standard will be easy.
Proponents of the Roy/Ragansky standard are likely to object, citing the great need to protect the President's person and his ability to perform his duties without interference as justification for an objective standard, at least for Section 871(a) threats. This rationale seems dated and disconnected from the complex reality of fending off assassination attempts and effectively investigating and monitoring those who would interfere with Office of the President by making threats. By 1998, the United States Secret Service had completed an operational study, the Exceptional Case Study Project, of the thinking and behavior of the eighty-three persons known to have attacked, or come close to attacking, prominent public officials and figures in the United States during the past fifty years. 159 This study revealed that it is a myth that "persons most likely to carry out attacks are those who make direct threats."
160 In fact, "[p]ersons who pose an actual threat often do not make threats, especially direct threats." 161 Indeed researchers demonstrated that of the eighty-three persons in the study, only twenty-seven (thirty-seven percent) had a history of making verbal or written direct threats about the target, only three (four percent) made such threats directly to the target of the threats, and only five (seven percent) made such threats directly to the target or law enforcement. 162 Those last two statistics help justify the factual dichotomy created by the Patillo court when it distinguished between those defendants who made threats "directly to the President intended," and those who did not. Since the more serious threat-an attack to the person of the President-is not likely to be prevented merely by enforcing the provisions of Section 871(a), the other goal of the statute-preventing disruption of the President's movements and duties-should weigh more heavily in deciding the standard to be employed.
Research conducted by economists Benjamin Olken and Benjamin Jones also indicates that assassination attempts have had a less significant impact on democratized states compared with autocracies. 163 The authors concluded, "assassinations of autocrats produce substantial changes in the country's institutions." 164 Yet, "the . . . assassination of democrats produces no change in institutions." 165 In other words, democracies are more resistant to the destabilizing effects of the loss of political leaders. Considering the peaceful uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa during 2011, 166 and the often violent responses to such movements by autocratic rulers, including the curtailing of dissenters' speech, assembly, and electronic communication capabilities, it is worth reflecting for a moment as to why this is the case. Democracies promote and protect values such as free speech. The criminal law in democratized states, especially the United States, typically demands that the government meet the highest burden of proof-beyond a reasonable doubt.
167
The criminal law in the Anglo-American tradition typically requires proof of criminal blameworthiness, especially in the case of felonies, which are punishable by more than a year in prison. 168 Such protections strengthen the institutions of democracy and instill in the people a sense that even senseless and shocking attacks, such as the assassination attempt of Representative Giffords, can be met with the peaceful resolve of a democratic society.
169
The Patillo court's 1971 holding deserves recognition as establishing a standard which best balances all interests involved in Section 871(a) cases. Properly understood, the Patillo holding created a subjective present intent requirement for category two cases (threats not directed to the President intended) that required proof of slightly different present intents in each case, based upon the theory of the case, including the third theory of disrupting presidential activity or the movements of the President. The court left open the possibility that a different standard might be adopted in category one cases (those directed to the President intended). 170 After all, when a person has taken the extra step of not only making a threat, but deliberately finding a way to direct that threat to the attention of the President (by mailing it to the White House, calling the White House, etc.), it is reasonable that a less demanding standard might be employed because the nature of the harm is more clear and the deliberateness of the act is more palpable. Thus, either the Roy/Ragansky Test or the Marshall Test could be adopted for category one cases and still be in line with the holding of Patillo. Such a mixed standard in Section 871(a) cases is the best possible standard going forward to protect the movements and duties of the President, to allow for effective investigations of assassination threats, and to protect the integrity of criminal law in America and our democratic institutions. This standard, coupled with the First Amendment protections of the threshold in Watts' "true threat" analysis, strikes the best possible balance for a statute like Section 871(a).
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